University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Management Papers

Wharton Faculty Research

4-1-2016

How Firms Shape Income Inequality: Stakeholder Power,
Executive Decision Making, and the Structuring of Employment
Relationships
Adam Cobb
University of Pennsylvania

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/mgmt_papers
Part of the Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods Commons

Recommended Citation
Cobb, A. (2016). How Firms Shape Income Inequality: Stakeholder Power, Executive Decision Making, and
the Structuring of Employment Relationships. Academy of Management Review, 41 (2), 324-348.
http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amr.2013.0451

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/mgmt_papers/181
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

How Firms Shape Income Inequality: Stakeholder Power, Executive Decision
Making, and the Structuring of Employment Relationships
Abstract
Focusing on developed countries, I present a model explaining how firms help determine rates of income
inequality at the societal level. I propose that the manner in which firms reward individuals for their labor,
how they match individuals to jobs, and where they place their boundaries contribute to levels of income
inequality in a society. I argue that the determinant of these three processes is due, in part, to the effect of
systems of corporate governance on the power and influence of different organizational stakeholders,
resulting in variance in the types of employment relationships that predominate in a society. I conclude
with a discussion of the research implications of emphasizing employers and employment practices as
key determinants of societal-level income inequality.

Keywords
income inequality, employment relationship, internal labor markets, wage setting, job matching, firm
boundaries, corporate governance, executive compensation

Disciplines
Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods

This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/mgmt_papers/181

HOW FIRMS SHAPE INCOME INEQUALITY: STAKEHOLDER POWER,
EXECUTIVE DECISION-MAKING, AND THE STRUCTURING OF EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIPS

J. Adam Cobb
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
2027 Steinberg Hall - Dietrich Hall
3620 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA
adamcobb@wharton.upenn.edu

Acknowledgements: I gratefully acknowledge the excellent suggestions and support provided
by Jone Pearce and the three anonymous reviwers. I thank Jerry Davis, Mauro Guillen, Katherine
Klein, Chris Marquis, Leslie McCall, Samir Nurmohammed, Lori Rosenkopf, Flannery Stevens,
Natalya Vinokurova, and Tyler Wry for thoughtful comments on earlier versions of the paper. I
also deeply appreciate the guidance and feedback provided by Matthew Bidwell and J.R. Keller
on multiple versions of the manuscript.

1

Abstract
Focusing on developed countries, I present a model explaining how firms help determine rates of
income inequality at the societal level. I propose that the manner in which firms reward
individuals for their labor, match individuals to jobs, and where they place their boundaries
contribute to levels of income stratification in a society. I argue the determinant of these three
processes is due, in part, to systems of corporate governance affecting the power and influence of
different organizational stakeholders, resulting in variance in the types of employment
relationships that predominate in a society. I conclude with a discussion of the research
implications of emphasizing employers and employment practices as key determinants of
societal-level income inequality.

Keywords: income inequality; employment relationship; internal labor markets; wage setting;
job matching; firm boundaries; corporate governance; executive compensation
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Despite Plutarch's millennia-old warning that "an imbalance between rich and poor is the
most fatal ailment of all republics," income inequality in the United States (US), which increased
22.5 percent between 1980 and 2011, is now greater than at any point since the onset of the Great
Depression (Atkinson, Piketty, & Saez, 2011). Other industrialized nations also experienced
rising income inequality during this period, including Finland (17.8%), Germany (15.4%), Japan
(20.6%), and the United Kingdom (UK) (32.9%), providing evidence of a broader, global trend.
The implications of understanding this phenomenon are profound as a host of issues with great
relevance, such as economic mobility, educational attainment, and life expectancies are found to
be related to income inequality (Stiglitz, 2012; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009).
Not surprisingly, scholars from across the social sciences have aimed to better understand
this phenomenon, typically advancing either market (e.g., skill-biased technological change,
globalization) or institutional (e.g., unionization, minimum wages, and tax policy) explanations
for its rise (Morris & Western, 1999). While providing many insights on the dynamics behind
rising income inequality, these accounts leave significant variance unexplained. In particular, one
of the challenges of existing theories is that they are often not substantiated by cross-national
analyses (see DiPrete, 2007; Gottschalk & Smeeding, 1997; Heyes, Lewis, & Clark, 2012).
Income inequality is a complex phenomenon with many factors likely playing a role in its rise,
and as such, opportunities exist for developing new ideas that can explain cross-national rates of
income inequality, complementing and extending our current perspectives of the phenomenon.
Taking an initial step toward this end, I introduce a model that suggests a key factor
determining rates of income inequality at the societal level are employers’ actions regarding how
they structure employment relationships. Though not often considered in existing theories of the
phenomenon, employers shape inequality by deciding how much to pay different workers in
different jobs (Baron, 1984). Research has indicated that across developed countries, over the
past several decades, both within- (Lazear & Shaw, 2009) and between-firm (Faggio, Salvanes,
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& Van Reenen, 2010) income inequality has risen, and that much of that rise results from firms
paying otherwise equivalent workers differently (DiNardo, Fortin, & Lemieux, 1996; Groshen,
1991). In fact, studies have suggested that nearly 40 percent of the total variation in wages across
countries emerges from similarly skilled workers being employed in firms that reward them
differently (see Abowd & Kramarz, 1999). Because over 90 percent of the labor force in
developed countries are employees of organizations (Marsden, 1999), research on income
inequality can be importantly enhanced by taking into account decisions employers make about
how to pay their workers, how they match workers to positions, and where employers place their
boundaries (i.e., how many workers do they employ). These considerations will help determine
the extent to which wages vary across different types of workers. How executives come to make
decisions about how to structure their firms’ employment relationships, I argue, is a consequence
of the power and interests of different organizational actors (March, 1962). I describe how
corporate governance mechanisms allocate power to various organizational stakeholders and
how these resulting power differentials affect the distribution of labor income in a society
through the decisions executives make about how to structure their employment relationships
Notwithstanding evidence suggesting employers play a significant role in determining
societal rates of income inequality, contemporary organizational scholarship has been mostly
silent about the phenomenon. A number of scholars have explored the consequences of wage
dispersion at the intra-organizational level (for a review see Shaw, 2014) without much attention
given to where inequality emerges. While organizational research has long examined
employment practices – such as wage setting (Balkin & Gomez-Mejia, 1990; Larkin, Pierce, &
Gino, 2012), executive compensation (Wade, O'Reilly, & Pollock, 2006), outsourcing (DavisBlake & Broschak, 2009), and layoffs (Budros, 1997) – the distributional consequences of these
changing practices to society has also been largely overlooked.
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Earlier conceptual work from the structuralist perspective did take seriously the role of
employers in wage-setting outcomes. According to this view, organizations are a key source of
income inequality because they provide unequal access to remuneration, rewards, and
opportunities for advancement, independent of worker characteristics (Baron, 1984). This
perspective failed to explain how firm practices aggregate to societal-level outcomes, however,
as empirical research focused on explaining patterns of inequality within firms (e.g., Kalleberg &
Van Buren, 1994). While an important area of inquiry, a singular focus on within-firm income
inequality may mask the broader impact of these employer choices. For instance, strategies that
lower within-firm income inequality, such as outsourcing and layoffs, may increase inequality
within a society. As a result, explaining what gives rise to wage dispersion inside firms is not
sufficient to explain income inequality within a country; rather, one must also consider how
decisions made inside the firm influence the dispersion of wages throughout the labor market.
In this paper, I introduce a model to explain how executives’ decisions regarding their
firms’ employment practices influence societal rates of income inequality. That is, I theorize
about factors that are determined by employers and associated with inequality, but are observed
across countries where those factors will noticeably vary. For employers to help determine rates
of income inequality necessitates that a country’s labor force be employed predominately by
firms versus self-employment or employment in the informal economy. Thus, my model is most
relevant for the study of labor income inequality in developed countries.
I first argue that employers vary in the extent to which they hold an internal,
organizational orientation or an external, market orientation (see Jacoby, 2005). This choice
informs the types of employment practices employers use, and I examine the distributional
impact of a set of those practices on society. Specifically, I explore how decisions made by
employers about how they set wages, how they match workers (including executives) to
positions, and where they place their boundaries affect income inequality at the societal level.
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Second, to explain cross-national variation in the use of these practices and to introduce a
set of factors that influence how employers come to these decisions, I leverage insights from
power-dependence (e.g., Emerson, 1962) and socio-political theories of corporate decision
making (e.g., Cyert & March, 1963). I take the perspective that organizations are a site of
conflict among different stakeholders who have vested interests in these decisions (Freeman,
1984; March, 1962). This perspective is relevant because the choices employers make about the
types of practices to use help determine how resources are allocated to different stakeholders and
as such, are subject to contestation (Bidwell, Briscoe, Fernandez-Mateo, & Sterling, 2013).
The paper is organized as follows: I begin with an overview of the literature on income
inequality, focusing on some of the main explanations given for its rise. I then introduce my
model of how employers influence societal rates of income. I conclude with a discussion of
implications for theory and empirical research of the phenomenon.
DEFINING AND EXPLAINING INCOME INEQUALITY
Income inequality captures the distribution of income across participants in a collective,
be it an organization, a region, or a country. Income is derived from a number of sources,
including earnings derived from labor, business, and investments (e.g., capital gains, dividends,
and interest) (CBO, 2011). Wealth, a distinct but related construct, captures the total value of
assets a family or individual owns – including homes, investments, and other savings. While any
discussion of economic inequality can be informed by considering both non-labor earnings and
wealth, the model presented here is about the role of firms in the wage-setting process.
Therefore, I focus solely on labor income inequality.1
Income inequality is also distinct from poverty. Whereas inequality indicates disparity in
how resources are allocated, poverty captures the number of individuals living in a state of
resource deprivation. Although one aspect of income inequality could be high rates of poverty, a
society can have high-income inequality and no poverty, or low-income inequality and high
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poverty. Although in many countries the two measures are correlated, since the late 1960s, much
of the developed world has seen rates of poverty decline while income inequality has risen
(World Bank, 2012), suggesting that the factors that influence income inequality do not always
have similar effects on poverty. Relatedly, income inequality differs from social inequality,
which characterizes the existence of unequal opportunities and rewards for different social
positions in a society—such as class, race, or sex—and encompasses an array of areas, including
access to education, healthcare, and voting rights (Sen, 1992). While there is often a reciprocal
relationship between them, factors influencing income are distinct from those influencing social
inequality, necessitating independent study of the phenomena (Kenworthy, 2007).
Income inequality can be measured in a number of ways and each method captures
somewhat different aspects of the phenomenon. For example, measures such as the Gini, Theil,
and Atkinson indices consider the allocation of income throughout the income distribution.
Others, such as simple ratios (e.g., top 1 percent, bottom 10 percent), and range ratios (e.g.,
90/10, 50/10 percentiles), focus on a single or ratio of points to draw inferences about the income
distribution. The choice of measure is important as it contains "implicit judgments about the
weight to be attached to inequality at different points on the income scale" (Atkinson, 1975: 47).
For example, the Gini index – a measure of the extent to which of income among individuals or
households deviates from a perfectly equal distribution – is most sensitive to inequalities in the
middle and less sensitive to inequalities at the top and bottom of the distribution. Simple and
range ratios capture dynamics at a pre-defined point(s), making them less useful for
understanding dynamics throughout the distribution. Examining the top 1 percent of earners, for
instance, provides few insights on how income is distributed within the top 1 percent as well as
on distribution throughout the lower 99 percent (Ray, 1998). Because the model I present has
implications for incomes throughout the distribution, for each employment practice discussed, I
identify which parts of the income distribution are likely to be most affected.
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Trends in Income Distribution
Prior analyses have revealed remarkable variety in rates and changes in income inequality
across countries and over time (e.g., Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty, & Saez, 2013; Roser &
Cuaresma, 2014). Notably, as measured by the Gini index, between 1980 and 2011 income
inequality rose considerably in diverse countries such as Australia (23.9 %), Poland (12.7%),
Portugal (48.4%), and Sweden (29.1%); remained relatively unchanged in countries like
Denmark (2.6%), France (4.7%), and Switzerland (- 1.5%); and declined in Ireland (- 8.9%) and
South Korea (- 11.9%).2 Scholars from across the social sciences have attempted to explain this
variance, focusing primarily on market- or institutional-based accounts. Before introducing my
model, I summarize some of the most common explanations for income inequality, discuss their
limitations, and suggest that incorporating the study of employers and employment practices may
complement these existing perspectives. There are a number of reviews on the topic (e.g., Katz
& Autor, 1999; Levy & Murnane, 1992; McCall & Percheski, 2010; Neckerman & Torche,
2007), so I cover the literature briefly.3
Technological Development
Efforts to explain income inequality have been developed primarily within the field of
neo-classical labor economics (DiPrete, 2007). Orthodox economic theory explains wage
differentials as being the product of variations in worker productivity and supply and demand.
Following this tradition, skill-biased technological change (SBTC) has emerged as one of the
most widely-cited drivers of income inequality. The SBTC argument states that income
inequality reflects changes in the relative supply of skilled labor and exogenous technological
change. Technologies enhance the marginal productivity of skilled workers while either lowering
or leaving unchanged the marginal productivity of unskilled workers (Autor, Katz, & Kearney,
2008; Johnson, 1997). One of the most popular technologies examined is the microcomputer,
which increases the demand for those with the requisite education and skills while making
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possible the routinization of certain types of work, rendering many middle-wage jobs expendable
(Acemoglu, 2002; Milgrom & Roberts, 1990; Violante, 2002).
Globalization
A related account for rising income inequality is that it is a consequence of globalization
(Bentele & Kenworthy, 2013; Dreher & Gaston, 2008). Much of the early study on globalization
and income inequality focused on trade flows. Two theoretical arguments, the Hecksher-Ohlin
model and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, speculate that as less-developed countries integrate
into the world economy, the demand for and returns to unskilled labor increase in those
countries, reducing income disparities. Conversely, the demand for skilled labor in developed
countries increases while the demand for low-skilled labor declines, exacerbating disparities
(Leamer, 1995). Empirical research, however, has not supported these accounts. Studies found
income inequality rose in developing countries as they integrated into the world economy
(Harrison, McLaren, & McMillan, 2011). More recent research on the impact of globalization on
wages and employment has examined the geographic shifts in the production of goods. For
example, studies of the impact of China’s manufacturing sector’s ascension have found it to have
a detrimental impact on manufacturing employment and wages (Autor, Dorn, & Hanson, 2013).
Unionization and Wage Bargaining
Another widely-cited explanation for rising income inequality is declining rates of
unionization (e.g., Jacobs & Myers, 2014). Research on unions and income inequality focus
primarily on two effects. First, a between-group effect whereby unions raise wages among lesseducated workers, thereby reducing inequalities between occupations. Second, a within-group
effect as collective bargaining standardizes wages within firms and industries, thereby reducing
differences between workers with similar characteristics (Freeman, 1980; Western & Rosenfeld,
2011). Research also suggests spillover effects in which the threat of unionization encourages
non-union firms to adopt similar employment practices (Farber, 2005). Supporting these claims,
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Card (2001) found that 15 to 20 percent of increases in income inequality in the US between
1970 and the early 1990s was due to declines in unionization; Fortin and colleagues (2012)
found similar results in Canada. Countries with greater unionization densities have, on average,
lower rates of income inequality (Alderson, Beckfield, & Nielsen, 2005), as do those with more
centralized wage-b argaining systems as centralization mutes the influence of different groups on
the wage-setting process (Oskarsson, 2005).
Public Policy
Economic, political science, and sociological research also points to the direct role of
public policy in impacting societal-level income inequality (e.g., Heathcote, Perri, & Violante,
2010; Kenworthy & Pontusson, 2005). This literature has focused heavily on two policy-related
outcomes: minimum wage and tax rates. When a minimum wage rate is increased, the overall
wage distribution is impacted by both a direct effect as workers earning less than the future
minimum rate receive a wage increase, and an indirect effect wherby the wages of many workers
above the minimum are increased so as to retain the relative wage ranking of occupations within
firms (Morris & Western, 1999). Combined, these two effects reduce income inequality by
increasing wages at the lower end of the wage distribution (see Blackburn, Bloom, & Freeman,
1990; DiNardo et al., 1996; Volscho, 2005). Others have suggested that income concentration is
an artifact of tax law, as across countries and over time, higher marginal tax rates are associated
with lower after-tax inequality (Alvaredo et al., 2013), as are specific tax policies aimed to
redistribute earnings (Neumark & Wascher, 2001). In fact, some scholars have argued that over
the long run, public policy intervention is the primary predictable mechanism through which
income inequality can be reduced, emphasizing that political decisions help determine how
income in a society is distributed (e.g., Bartels, 2008; Piketty, 2014).
Limitations of Existing Research

10

Each of the aforementioned research streams have made important contributions to our
understanding of factors affecting rates of income inequality. However, while providing many
valuable insights, these accounts do leave some key questions unanswered. In particular, these
accounts do not always hold up to cross-national comparison. For example, comparable levels of
income inequality have not been observed in countries such as those in Continental Europe,
Japan, and Scandinavia, despite these countries’ heavy adoption of computer technologies (Lin
& Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013). Also, rates of income inequality in many countries began climbing
before the widespread introduction of information and communication technologies (ICTs) and
stabilized in the 1990s when ICTs were more widely diffused (Card & DiNardo, 2002; DiPrete,
2007; Katz & Autor, 1999). Data from countries such as Austria, Finland, Italy, and Sweden
suggest that high and increasing levels of union density have not prevented increases in income
inequality (Heyes et al., 2012). Many countries with low rates of income inequality have no or
limited minimum wage laws (Card, Heining, & Kline, 2013), and minimum wages tell us little
about changes throughout the wage distribution. Given the vast differences in tax law across
developed countries, cross-national comparisons in this area have also proven challenging
(Gottschalk & Smeeding, 1997).
Due to the complexity of the phenomenon, it stands to reason that a singular, universal
explanation of income inequality is unlikely to emerge, and there is seemingly ample opportunity
to develop new theories of how income inequality in a society is determined. Given the vital role
played by firms for wage-setting outcomes, an organizational theory-based perspective on
income inequality may be a particularly valuable addition. In particular, a firm-centered theory
may help address some empirical puzzles plaguing existing theories of income inequality. For
instance, that technology has not led to rising income inequality in many countries may be due to
how those technologies are adopted by firms (Fernandez, 2001). Evidence also shows that
otherwise equivalent establishments located in different countries and establishments of the same
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firm across countries vary in the employment practices utilized (e.g., Finegold & Mason, 1999;
Siegel & Larson, 2009). As such, a firm-centered account can help link market and institutional
factors to individual outcomes by highlighting how a firm’s broader macro environment gets
translated into firm practices that impact workers (Baron & Bielby, 1980).
In the sections below, I introduce my model of how employers impact income inequality
at the societal level (see Figure 1). I first describe how employers generate inequality through the
processes of wage setting, job matching, and boundary placement. I then describe factors that
may influence how executives enact these three processes.
-----------------------------Insert Figure 1 about here
-----------------------------FIRMS AND INCOME INEQUALITY
Human Resource Systems and Firm Strategy
A number of typologies of employment exist, including that from Boxall and Purcell
(2011), Lepak and Snell (1999), and Sonnenfeld and colleagues (1988). I borrow from Jacoby’s
(2005) typology as it is the most parsimonious yet still captures differences in employment
dynamics relevant to the study of income inequality. According to Jacoby (2005), systems of
corporate employment can be categorized broadly into two ideal types: organizational or market
oriented. Table 1 outlines some basic features of each type of system. The main distinction
between the two systems is the extent to which they rely on internal (i.e., organizational) versus
external (i.e., market) criteria in the structuring of employment relationships. An organizational
focus is associated with stable employment with low turnover, extensive use of training, and the
dominance of internal considerations – such as a desire for equity – on executive decision
making. In such a system, employers protect workers from many of the vagaries of market
forces; they take a longer-term perspective on performance and favor corporate strategies that
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necessitate a stable, well-trained, and loyal workforce. A market focus, on the other hand, is
characterized by flexible employment relationships with higher turnover, fewer opportunities for
training, and pay and allocation decisions based on external criteria. The shorter-term orientation
discourages employers from bearing market risks on behalf of their workers and encourages
them to utilize employment practices that lower costs and increase flexibility (Kalleberg, 2011).
-----------------------------Insert Table 1 about here
-----------------------------Whether a firm adopts an organizational or market orientation is related to the firm’s
choice of employment practices (Jacoby, 2005; Kalleberg, 2011). I focus here on a set of
practices likely to impact the distribution of income in a society, arguing that firms generate
income inequality through how they reward workers (including executives) for their labor, how
they match them to jobs, and where firms place their boundaries (i.e., how many workers the
firm employs). In countries where a higher proportion of employment is in firms using an
organizational (market) orientation, I argue income inequality will be lower (higher).
Importantly, employers fall along a continuum between having an organizational versus market
orientation, and firms do not necessarily utilize one strategy but often use combinations of both
(Siegel & Larson, 2009). That is, within a given firm, some workers can be governed by
employment relationships based on external market considerations while other workers are
governed by organizational considerations (Lepak & Snell, 1999). Nonetheless, the emphasis
here is on the consequences to society of the relative propensity of firms to pursue a market
versus an organizational orientation and the types of practices they are likely to utilize as a result.
Wage Setting and Job Matching
Neo-classical economics emphasizes that income differentials are the result of unequal
endowments in productive capacities among individuals; therefore, individuals with identical
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skills should obtain relatively equivalent earnings regardless of the job they are in (e.g., Becker,
1964). Wages, however, are typically tied to jobs rather than individuals (Granovetter, 1981;
Thurow, 1975), and once we allow features of a job to influence wage outcomes, how firms
match workers to positions and how they reward workers for their labor become important
determinants of how labor income is distributed in a society (Sørensen & Sorenson, 2007).
An internal, organizational orientation toward wage setting is consistent with the use of
internal labor markets (ILMs), whereby "pricing, allocation, and training decisions are governed
by a set of administrative rules and procedures" rather than by external market forces (Doeringer
& Piore, 1971: 1-2), and workers' jobs and wages are insulated from external market forces
(Cappelli, 2001). One of the more evident manifestations of this approach is in the wage-setting
process. Historically, the most common method used by larger firms to set compensation was
through job evaluation – a formalized system for ascertaining the relative value of different jobs
in a firm (Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, & Franco-Santos, 2010) – which was utilized, in large part, to
reduce wage inequality inside of firms (Sanchez & Levine, 2012). For example, in a prototypical
point-based job evaluation system, such as the Hay System that emerged in the 1940s and gained
worldwide popularity over the ensuing decades, each job is evaluated along dimensions such as
required skill, effort, scope of responsibility, and working conditions (Boxall & Purcell, 2011).
Jobs are then assigned wages based on their value to the firm and in relation to other jobs within
the organization. Though jobs that require greater levels of competencies and are more highly
valued by the firm receive greater pay, historically these systems were developed to create a
sense of internal pay equity (Dulebohn & Werling, 2007). By assigning wages to the job and
establishing criteria by which jobs are compared, employers hope to mitigate perceptions of
inequity in how wages throughout the hierarchy are set (Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1992).
There are at least two factors, then, that suggest the presence of ILMs across a population
of firms will reduce income inequality in a society (see Figure 2). First, to ensure internal equity
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across jobs, firms utilize administrative procedures – guided by concerns for internal equity –
that set appropriate pay differentials across jobs, implying greater equality of compensation than
would otherwise exist, and that lower within- and between-group income differentials. Second
and relatedly, ILMs are typically associated with a wage premium that is greater for lower- than
higher-skilled workers (Groshen & Levine, 1998), suggesting a between-group effect whereby
wages are more compressed between lower- and higher-skilled workers than would be otherwise.
In fact, in countries like Japan, the UK, and the US, income inequality was at its lowest levels
when ILMs predominated, and the breakdown of ILMs coincided with rising income inequality
in a number of countries (Cappelli, 2001; Davis & Cobb, 2010).
-----------------------------Insert Figure 2 about here
-----------------------------Unlike in ILMs, the use of market-based employment practices reduces the influence of
bureaucratic processes that determine hiring, promotion, and remuneration. Opening them to
competition affords firms greater flexibility in how they manage their employment relationships;
this competition appeals to firms who favor a market orientation (Jacoby, 2005). The
consequences of a market-based employment relationship on income inequality are also
significant. Rather than wages being set through evaluation systems that promote internal equity,
in external labor markets, wages are more likely to be based on the relative quality of workers,
evidenced by performance, skills, and credentials, as well as on the broader market forces of
supply and demand. Individual variations in performance can be significant (Schmidt & Hunter,
1981), and market-oriented wage setting reveals and reflects these variations through pay
differences. As such, wage-setting systems that reward workers based on their productivity, such
as is the case in pay-for-performance schemes, can lead to higher levels of income inequality
since they increase the wage gap between more and less productive workers (Bandiera,
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Barankay, & Rasul, 2007; Lemieux, 2011). In the US, the use of these schemes, which are more
common among higher-income workers, is responsible for over 20 percent of the rise in income
inequality between the late 1970s and the early 1990s (Lemieux, MacLeod, & Parent, 2009). A
number of studies have also substantiated that worker wages are positively correlated with firm
profitability (e.g., Blanchflower, Oswald, & Sanfey, 1996; Gürtzgen, 2010) and found an
increased use of firm-based compensation practices such as bonuses and stock options (e.g.,
Kruse, Freeman, & Blasi, 2010). Wages, then, for workers with similar skills but in different
firms will vary based on disparities in firm performance.
Similarly, when hiring occurs largely from outside of the firm, information asymmetries
between workers and employers are likely to impact wages. Bidwell (2011) argued that
differences in pay between external and internal hires should reflect differences in the observable
characteristics between the two types of candidates. Firms have less knowledge of external
candidates’ unobservable skills and talents. To compensate for this, these candidates typically
have greater levels of observable traits, such as education and credentials. Because those
observable traits are easily transferrable across firms, whereas unobservable characteristics –
such as tacit knowledge (Althauser & Kalleberg, 1981) or culture fit (Chatman, 1991) – are not,
observable characteristics are more highly rewarded in the labor market. Moreover, because
external hires lack information about their fit for the job and within the firm, they must be
compensated for the increased risk they bear by switching employers. External hiring, then, can
lead to higher income inequality at the societal level because in comparison to individuals
lacking them, employees with greater levels of visible credentials and stronger social networks
receive greater rewards (Bidwell, 2011; Bridges & Villemez, 1986). Likewise, when hiring
occurs predominately from outside the firm, younger and lower-skilled workers are often sorted
into and remain in lower-paying jobs (Autor & Houseman, 2010), as are women and minorities
(Prokos, Padavic, & Schmidt, 2009). Rather than individual attainment being a function of
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bureaucratic procedures, careers span across firms with little predictability (Bidwell & Briscoe,
2010), implying greater variance in wage outcomes for similarly skilled individuals. In short,
where firms rely more heavily on market-oriented wage setting and external hiring, we should
see movement away from the middle of the income distribution towards the tails, leading to
greater wage dispersion at the societal level.
Proposition 1: In countries where workers are employed by firms favoring the use of external
labor market rather than internal labor market mechanisms to set wages and match workers to
jobs, income inequality at the societal level will be higher.
Executive Compensation
One factor regularly cited for why income inequality has risen over the past 35 years is
the gap in wages between the highest earners – those in the upper 1 or .01 percent – and all other
earners (e.g., Atkinson et al., 2011). The average annual earnings of the top 1 percent of wage
earners in the US grew 275 percent from 1979 to 2007 (CBO, 2011). Those in the remaining top
20 percent, the middle 60 percent, and bottom 20 percent grew by 65, 40, and 18 percent,
respectively (Kim, Kogut, & Yang, 2013). Understanding overall changes in income inequality,
therefore, can be markedly enhanced by considering the influence of top incomes.
Though salaries in many professions, such as those for professional athletes, celebrities,
and finance professionals increased dramatically during this period (Kaplan & Rauh, 2009), data
show that in countries such as Germany (Bach, Corneo, & Steiner, 2009), the US (Bakija, Cole,
& Heim, 2012), Australia and the UK (see OECD, 2011: 351), non-financial executives,
managers, and supervisors constitute the largest occupational category of the highest earners.
Across countries, there is considerable variance in the relative pay of executives to the median
worker. For example, in 2012, the ratio of CEO pay to the median worker was 58 to 1 in
Norway, 67 to 1 in Japan, 104 to 1 in France, 147 to 1 in Germany, and 354 to 1 in the US (The
Globalist, 2013). Given the representation of executives among top earners and the stark cross-
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national differences in how well compensated they are relative to the average worker, how firms
set compensation for executives plays a key role in determining a society's level of income
inequality. I examine three ways in which firms set the compensation of their executives that
may influence societal levels of income inequality: performance-based pay, external
benchmarking, and external hiring.
Performance-based pay and external benchmarking. Over the past several decades in
many developed countries, there has been an effort to tie executive compensation more closely to
metrics of firm performance. In particular, across many countries, executive compensation
schemes increasingly include equity compensation, whereby options to purchase shares of stock
at a set price are granted to management on the basis of firm performance (Murphy, 2013).
Where firm performance outpaces wage growth – such as in the US where between 1990 and
2005 when average worker wages increased 4 percent while corporate profits increased 107
percent – inequalities in income will increase. Specifically, the upper tail of the income
distribution will shift outward.
Interestingly, however, a tighter coupling of executive compensation and firm
performance does not seem sufficient for explaining the growth in CEO wages. Notably,
evidence confirms that in many places, CEO pay has outpaced firm performance, growing 298
percent in the US during this same period (Anderson, Cavanagh, Collins, & Benjamin, 2006).
One reason for the outpaced growth of executive wages results from how executive
compensation gets set. Notably, a number of studies have examined the practice whereby
corporate boards, often aided by compensation consultants, benchmark the pay of their
executives to those of other firms (see Kim et al., 2013). When benchmarking, executive
compensation is targeted at a specific range (e.g., 50th, 75th, 90th) of the benchmarked firms;
rarely ever is it below the median (Bizjak, Lemmon, & Naveen, 2008). If most firms use external
benchmarking and aim to pay at or above the median, pay will increase due to the upward bias in
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target and the repeated "leapfrogging" of firms (Elson & Ferrere, 2013). Moreover, this
benchmarking system creates feedback loops such that the decision by a small number of
corporate boards to dramatically increase executive pay has a sizeable influence on executive
pay at other firms (DiPrete, Eirich, & Pittinsky, 2010). When creating the benchmark, boards
often include a set of aspirational firms that are larger and employ considerably higher paid
executives. For example, in 2012, the median firm on Viacom’s benchmark list was 56 percent
larger by market capitalization and had double its revenues (Mider & Green, 2012). Thus, even
where a firm sets its benchmark at the median of its benchmark group, that group is often
upwardly biased, making an executive’s pay much greater than the median of a comparable set
of firms. As a result, the use of external benchmarking to set pay has the potential to drive
executive income higher than would be expected by rising corporate profits alone.
Potentially, a firm could set wages for all its workers via external benchmarking;
however, for a number of reasons, it is unlikely this would curb rising income inequality. First, in
many settings, because executive compensation is tied more closely to firm performance than it
is for most workers, to the extent that corporate profits exceed workers’ returns to their marginal
product, income inequality will increase. Second, because executive wages are considerably
higher than those of the average worker, worker wages would have to increase at a higher rate
than that of executives to prevent inequality from growing. Third, the incentive for firms to set
worker wages above the median and to use a biased benchmark group is likely to be lower than
when benchmarking for executives. Therefore, to the extent that firms use external
benchmarking to set pay, we should see higher rates of income inequality at the societal level as
the right tail of the income distribution will grow and shift outward.
In contrast, employers can rely on internal benchmarking of CEO pay, whereby the CEO
wage is set in comparison to the salaries of those employed in the company. In some of the
earliest analyses of executive compensation, researchers considered the possibility that
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executives were paid on the basis of comparison to other employees of the firm (e.g., Simon,
1957) or a combination of comparing executive pay to that of similar firms and utilizing internal
comparison (Patton, 1951). Firms such as Whole Foods cap CEO pay at its average annual wage,
while others such as Northwestern Corporation ensure that executive compensation is "internally
equitable and consistent" (Brancaccio, 2012). Where executive compensation is determined in
larger part by internal benchmarking, the ratio of executive pay to that of the average workers is
likely to be somewhat constrained. To the extent that this practice is common in a society, top
incomes are likely to be reduced, thereby lowering aggregate income inequality.
Proposition 2a: In countries where firms favor the use of performance-based pay systems to
remunerate executives, income inequality at the societal level will be higher.
Proposition 2b: In countries where firms favor the use of external rather than internal
benchmarking to set executive pay, income inequality at the societal level will be higher.
External hiring. Another factor linked to rising executive compensation is the increased
incidence of firms recruiting CEOs from outside of the organization. During the 1970s in the US,
fewer than 15 percent of newly appointed CEOs were hired externally. By the late 1990s, nearly
a third of all CEO appointments came from outside of firms (Murphy & Zabojnik, 2008). Much
in the same way that external hiring of workers alters the demand for observable skills, the
utilization of external hiring represents a shift in the reliance on general managerial versus firmspecific skills. Such a shift increases competition for skilled labor in the executive labor market,
driving up wages (Murphy & Zabojnik, 2008). To compensate executives for the loss in future
value of their firm-specific investments, the hiring organization may also need to pay a premium
to entice an executive to switch firms (Harris & Helfat, 1997). In fact, many of the more
generous executive compensation packages have been the result of contracts negotiated with
external candidates at the time of hire, not deals reached with incumbents (Murphy, 2013).
Combined, these factors suggest that the reliance on external hiring of executives is likely to be
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associated with higher levels of compensation, thereby exacerbating income inequality by
increasing the size of the right tail of the country’s income distribution and shifting it outward.
Proposition 2c: In countries where firms favor the use of external rather than internal hiring to
match executives to their positions, income inequality at the societal level will be higher.
Firm Boundaries: Who and How Many to Employ
Non-standard work arrangements. The prototypical standard employment relationship
consists of stable, full-time employment in which the worker is employed directly by the firm.
Executives can, however, organize work utilizing a number of arrangements that fall under the
umbrella term non-standard work, which includes contracting, outsourcing, temporary work, and
part-time employment (Cappelli & Keller, 2013a). Non-standard work arrangements differ from
standard ones in a number of ways, including administrative control often being handled by a
third-party organization (such as in the case of temporary and contract labor), and no expectation
of continued employment (Kalleberg, 2011). When making the decision to use non-standard
work arrangements, executives may be motivated by a variety of factors, such as increasing the
firm's flexibility or lowering economic and social comparison costs (Autor, 2003; Nickerson &
Zenger, 2008). In general, employers favoring a market orientation are more likely to utilize
these non-standard work arrangements (Kalleberg, 2011). Not surprisingly, researchers have
begun to explore the causes and consequences of these work arrangements for employers and
workers (Cappelli & Keller, 2013b; Dube & Kaplan, 2010; Peck & Theodore, 2007). Few
efforts, however, have been made to connect their spread to rising levels of income inequality.
In part-time and temporary arrangements, workers are employed directly by the focal
firm but at rates typically below what is earned by full-time employees. Because many workers
are employed in these positions involuntarily and often face constraints in the number of hours
they can work, total labor income inequality is likely to increase as a result of these
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arrangements. As part-time and temporary workers are utilized in place of full-time workers, we
should expect societal rates of income inequality to rise.
When employers externalize employment through use of outsourcing or offshoring, the
distribution of jobs within the organization changes. Entire functions and departments are
routinely extricated from the firms' boundaries and handled by outside vendors. For example,
Cappelli (1999: 74) recounts how IBM outsourced all clerical jobs below the rank of executive
secretary to employment agencies like Manpower Inc. Research has shown that outsourced
employees have fewer opportunities for promotion and training than those retained in-house
(Walsh & Deery, 2006). Moreover, in a study of outsourcing of janitors and security guards,
Dube and Kaplan (2010) found that outsourced workers earn routinely less than in-house
employees, and that this is in large part due to mid- to high-paying jobs turning into lowerpaying jobs or being removed altogether (see also van Jaarsveld & Yanadori, 2011).
By outsourcing, firms can keep the wages and conditions of employment closer to market
rates without disrupting norms of equity (Cappelli, 1999; Nickerson & Zenger, 2008). In so
doing, these jobs become separated from ILMs that reduced the wage disjuncture across
hierarchical levels and between occupations. While some high-skilled contract workers benefit
from such arrangements (Kunda, Barley, & Evans, 2002), the vast majority of contract workers
are employed in low- or middle-wage jobs. In the case of firms moving or outsourcing jobs to
vendors in a foreign country, domestic income inequality is likely to rise due to higher
unemployment. Outsourcing and offshoring, therefore, should be associated with greater levels
of income inequality at the societal level. In particular, we should see a hollowing of the middle,
growth in the left tail, and potentially modest growth in the right tail of the income distribution.
Proposition 3: In countries where workers are employed by firms favoring the use of nonstandard work arrangements, income inequality at the societal level will be higher.
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Layoffs. Another market-oriented practice firms use to alter their boundaries is
performing layoffs – a termination of employment for reasons generally out of an employee's
control. Typically, employers utilize layoffs in an effort to improve the firm’s efficiency
(Hallock, 2009). While layoffs can be temporary, here I focus on permanent terminations. In the
short-run, displacement increases unemployment, exacerbating societal income differentials.
Widespread layoffs affect market dynamics, increasing the supply of workers and lowering their
bargaining power, thus driving down wages. In the medium- to long-term, evidence from across
a number of developed countries shows that having been laid-off contributes to a long-lasting,
negative impact on workers’ wages once they reenter the workforce (e.g., Hijzen, Upward, &
Wright, 2010; Schmieder, von Wachter, & Bender, 2010). Job displacement in the US has
disproportionately affected those in lower- to middle-income occupations, such as craftsmen,
operatives, laborers, and supervisors, as well as those working in manufacturing industries that
traditionally paid good wages (Conyon, Girma, Thompson, & Wright, 2001; Kletzer, 1998). To
the extent that laid-off workers are predominately employed in low- and mid-wage jobs,
downsizing will increase income differentials at the societal level as the middle of the income
distribution shrinks and the left tail grows and shifts outward.
Proposition 4: In countries where layoffs affect a larger proportion of workers, income
inequality at the societal level will be higher.
FIRM COALITIONS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
AND EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
In the section above, I argued that societal levels of income inequality are determined, in
part, by decisions made by firms. Specifically, I contended that rates of inequality are affected by
the extent of employment in firms that predominately utilize practices reflecting a market versus
an organizational orientation. To what extent, however, do individual employers and their
executives differ in their preferences for a market or organizational focus? Viewing firms as a set
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of political coalitions (Cyert & March, 1963; March, 1962), I argue the answer is that because
these two orientations have distinct implications for how firm resources are divided among
various stakeholder groups, the power and interests of different organizational actors help
determine which strategy an employer will pursue. Coalitions consist of groups of individuals
with similar interests seeking to have their preferences met by the organization. Coalitions
themselves often have divergent interests, and in most cases, no single group is able to determine
the goals they want the organization to pursue. In Emerson’s (1962) account of powerdependence relations, he argues that outcomes from an exchange relationship derive from the
dependence one party has upon another in obtaining a needed resource (see also Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978). What determines the outcomes of negotiations between coalitions is determined,
in part, by the relative power of each. Coalitional power and changes therein should be reflected
in the goals, strategies, and practices used by the organization (Wry, Cobb, & Aldrich, 2013).
I focus here on two key stakeholder groups that make firm-specific investments (Aguilera
& Jackson, 2003): shareholders and executives. I argue that their interests and influence play an
important role in whether a firm utilizes an organization or market orientation when structuring
their employment practices. A third stakeholder group, labor (i.e., non-management workers),
also has a vested interest in the outcome of firm decisions. While I do discuss labor’s influence
on employment practices in the discussion section, because labor power is typically codified into
laws that determine the scope and strength of labor protection – including collective bargaining
rights, which have been studied extensively by scholars of the phenomenon – I offer no formal
proposition for the influence of labor on income inequality.
Shareholder Influence: Monitoring and Incentives
Share ownership structure. Since the writings of Berle and Means (1932), social
scientists have been interested in understanding how stock ownership structure influences
organizational action since a firm’s controlling interest directly affects its goals and structure

24

(Chaganti & Damanpour, 1991; Fiss & Zajac, 2004). This influence, however, is moderated by
the extent to which equity ownership is concentrated. When share ownership is dispersed among
a large number of shareholders, executives have greater discretion to pursue strategies that
enhance their own personal interests (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). For example, dispersed
ownership is associated with a greater proclivity of management to pursue firm growth strategies
through diversified acquisitions (Amihud & Lev, 1981), to utilize compensation schemes
rewarding growth rather than performance (Wright, Kroll, & Elenkov, 2002), and to provide
workers with better paying jobs (Liu, van Jaarsveld, Batt, & Frost, 2014). Concentrated
ownership, on the other hand, encourages corporate boards to weigh shareholders' interests more
heavily when evaluating firm strategy (Desender, Aguilera, Crespi, & Garcia-Cestona, 2013).
There are, however, many different types of shareholders, such as families, mutual funds,
and private equity firms, which have different interests, investment strategies, and time horizons.
Shareholders fall largely into two types: those taking a longer-term, strategic view and those
taking a shorter-term, financial view of their investments (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). For
example, throughout much of Continental Europe, Japan, and Latin America, large shareholders
tend to be banks and corporations (e.g., customers or suppliers) who use equity stakes as a means
to pursue strategic interests. The potential loss of commercial business outstrips dividend
income, motivating these shareholders to prefer strategies that enhance the long-term survival
prospects of their investments (Schneper & Guillen, 2004). A longer-term perspective translates
into a preference for firm strategies based on long-term growth and product market domination,
reinforcing forms of corporate organization that allow firms to benefit from workers’
accumulation of firm-specific and other human capital investments (Amable, 2003).
In contrast, shareholders with a shorter-term, financial view, such as private equity firms
and many types of institutional investors, are more likely to encourage firms to engage in actions
that maximize profitability (Cobb, 2015; Useem, 1996), thus performance in equity markets
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plays a more significant role in corporate strategy (Jensen & Murphy, 2009). One consequence
of this system is that the market plays a central role in determining firm structure. As John Brian,
CEO of Sara Lee, stated, “Wall Street can wipe you out. They are the rule-setters. They do have
their fads, but to a large extent there is an evolution in how they judge companies, and they have
decided to give premiums to companies that harbor the most profits for the least assets”
(Lowenstein, 1997). Evidence shows that investors pursuing financial interests motivate firms to
engage in tactics that increase shareholder value in the short-term and to engage less in long-term
strategic decision making (Bushee, 1998; Connelly, Tihanyi, Certo, & Hitt, 2010). The
prevalence and influence of shareholders with short-term interests, therefore, is likely to be
associated with firms minimizing their investment in fixed assets and making their boundaries
more permeable. The benefits accrued to employers from utilizing ILMs are gained over the long
run (Cappelli, 2001), so a short-term focus reduces their value to the firm and its investors.
Additionally, several scholars have suggested that the growth of private equity and institutional
investors pursuing market interests has led to wage cuts and corporate reorganization via layoffs
(Batt & Appelbaum, 2013; Fligstein & Shin, 2007; Shleifer & Summers, 1988). Shareholders
concerned with maximizing market returns are also likely to prefer more open, flexible
employment relationships as it provides for a tighter coupling between wages and productivity
(Sørensen & Kalleberg, 1981).
Proposition 5a: In countries where equity is owned predominately by investors pursuing shortterm financial interests, employers will be more likely to take a market orientation when
structuring their employment relationships.
The structure of equity ownership can also influence executive compensation.
Throughout many developed countries, the increase in executive pay has been largely due the
growth of equity-based compensation (Murphy, 2013) achieved, in part, by investors who
advocated its use (Jung & Dobbin, 2014; Westphal & Zajac, 1998). In recent years, foreign
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investors – particularly UK- and US-based institutional investors – have increased their
shareholdings in foreign firms, placing pressure on them to adopt and abide by US corporate
governance (and employment) practices (Ahmadjian & Robinson, 2001; Fiss & Zajac, 2004;
Jacoby, 2005). This leads to higher executive pay and the increased use of equity-based pay in
firms in which they invest (Murphy, 2013). However, not all shareholders are as willing to
endorse expansions in executive compensation. Many pension funds, for example, have
attempted to curb executive pay through proxy contests, and the AFL-CIO tracks the vigilance of
institutional investors on executive pay issues, showing considerable variance in these investors’
willingness to support management over pay issues.
Taken together, this suggests that firms will be more apt to use performance-based pay,
external hiring, outsourcing, part-time labor, layoffs, as well as have higher levels of executive
compensation when a firm’s equity is predominately owned by shareholders pursuing shorterterm interests and favoring the use of equity-based executive compensation.
Proposition 5b: In countries where equity is owned predominately by investors favoring high
levels of equity-based compensation, employers will be more likely to take a market orientation
when structuring their employment relationships.
Takeovers and corporate control. A second external monitoring mechanism that
influences executive decision making is the threat of takeover (Walsh & Seward, 1990).
Takeovers are coupled frequently with a change in management, thus the market for corporate
control raises the cost of self-dealing for executives (Manne, 1965) and ensures executives attend
to the interests of shareholders (Fama, 1980). While countries vary considerably in the extent to
which hostile takeovers are used to discipline managers (Schneper & Guillen, 2004), studies
have revealed that when freed from takeover pressures, executives extract higher pay for their
workers (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 1999, 2003) and pursue stakeholder-friendly practices such
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as community development (Kacperczyk, 2009). Non-shareholding stakeholder welfare is thus
thought to be enhanced when management has more autonomy.
One direct consequence of takeovers is that they often lead to employee layoffs (Conyon
et al., 2001), which, as discussed above, can exacerbate inequalities in income. Moreover, an
active market for corporate control discourages management from taking actions that lower firm
market value, thus making the firm an attractive takeover target. Taking on debt, stock
repurchases, increasing dividend payments, spinning off under-performing business units, and
reducing labor costs through various forms of restructuring are all strategies management has
employed in response to takeover threats (Davis, 2009). While beneficial to shareholders, each of
these actions undermines firm stability by reallocating resources in order to enhance short-term
performance. Because the benefits of ILMs are long-term in nature, the risk of takeover makes
ILMs a less appealing option for employers and workers. For example, changes in share
ownership are thought to weaken firms' reputations for long-term relationships (Shleifer &
Summers, 1988), thus threats of and successful hostile takeovers are likely to discourage workers
from making firm-specific investments. Without such investments, ILMs become less necessary
and external labor market mechanisms are utilized more frequently.
Proposition 6: In countries with a more active takeover market, employers will be more likely to
take a market orientation when structuring their employment relationships.
Aligning interests through incentives. While the direct impact of executive pay levels
on income inequality was discussed above, here I suggest that an indirect effect, whereby
monetary incentives influence executive decision making about what types of employment
practices to use. Financial theorists have proposed that equity compensation is used to align
executives’ goals with those of the firm (e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 1976), and managers with
equity in the firm are more likely to embrace shareholder concerns and direct the firm in their
joint interests, thereby reducing the gap between ownership and control (Dalton, Hitt, Certo, &
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Dalton, 2007). Specifically, stock options provide an incentive for managers to make decisions
that boost equity values, often with the consequence of lower worker wages and increased
employment insecurity (Minsky, 1996). Furthermore, such schemes typically have short vesting
periods that allow executives to reap the rewards of their actions before their full effect may be
realized, disincentivizing the use of firm strategies based on firm stability and long-term growth
(Murphy, 1999). Taken together, where monetary incentives are tied more closely to market
investor interests, executives are likely to utilize firm strategies that favor flexible employment
relationships and short-term performance. Such a short-term focus discourages the use of ILMs
and encourages altering firm boundaries through non-standard work arrangements and layoffs.
Proposition 7: In countries where executive compensation is based primarily on firm financial
performance, employers will be more likely to take a market orientation when structuring their
employment relationships.
Executive Power and Decision Making
While there exist constraints on their discretion, by the nature of their position, top
executives have considerable power and authority to set firms’ goals and strategies (Fligstein,
1991). Whether they choose a market or organizational orientation is determined, in part, by their
own beliefs about the most effective way to structure their employment relationships. These
schemas, which emerge from prior experience (Skinner, 1953), help determine the goals of and
guide decisions in the firm (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986).
The functional and educational background of an employer's top executive(s), therefore, are
likely to play a role in determining the purpose of the corporation as well as its objectives and
strategies (Fligstein, 1990; Ocasio & Kim, 1999).
The fields of finance and economics have a strong commitment to the primacy of
markets. This suggests that executives with a background in these fields will hold more positive
views toward using market mechanisms to structure employment relationships. CEOs with a
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background in finance or economics are also thought to consider shareholder interests over those
of other stakeholders when making strategic decisions (Fiss & Zajac, 2004) as these disciplines
strongly support the shareholder value orientation. The prevalence of CEOs with a strong
financial background suggests these firms prefer CEOs "who understand the financial
ramifications of business decisions" (Sanders, 2011). Evidence shows that CEOs of German
firms with a law or economics background are more likely to espouse a shareholder value
orientation (Fiss & Zajac, 2004). CEOs with a background in finance have also been found to be
more likely to engage in downsizing (Budros, 2000).
In contrast, executives with backgrounds in other disciplines may be less inclined to
implement market-oriented practices if they conflict with other objectives. For example,
executives in Germany tend to have PhDs in engineering or science (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003)
and are guided by a desire to achieve technical excellence, rather than pursuing narrow financial
interests (Lawrence, 1980). Evidence also suggests that firms develop more novel strategies and
are more likely to alter them over time when its executives have a more diverse background (i.e.,
one spanning a number of functional areas) (Crossland, Zyung, Hiller, & Hambrick, 2014).
Given a predisposition toward a market orientation and attention to financial measures of
performance, I expect that in comparison to firms with CEOs with other backgrounds, CEOs
with a functional or educational background primarily in finance or economics are more likely to
structure their employment relationships utilizing a market orientation.
Proposition 8: In countries where executives have a background predominately in finance or
economics, employers will be more likely to take a market orientation when structuring their
employment relationships.
DISCUSSION
Income inequality is one of the defining social problems of contemporary times (World
Economic Forum, 2014), and scholars from across the social sciences have sought to better
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explain where it arises from and to what effect. With but a few exceptions, however,
explanations ignore the role played by firms. Employers are of great importance to the study of
the phenomenon because they make decisions about who to hire, how much to pay, and how
many to employ (Baron, 1984), and, as such, influence rates of income inequality at the societal
level. Furthermore, how executives are impacted by monitoring structures, incentives, and the
schemas used when making these choices is squarely in the purview of organizational
scholarship, making our field uniquely suited to study income inequality. That few have done so
while having the capacity to add much to the scholarly debate provides an interesting
opportunity. By introducing a model of how employers influence income inequality at the
societal level, I hope to provide future researchers a platform for the study of this phenomenon.
The model I present articulates the distributional consequences of different employment
practices and how firms come to make them. Specifically, I discuss how three key elements of
firms' strategy and structure – how employees (including executives) are rewarded for their
labor, are matched to jobs, and where a firm places its boundaries – affect societal rates of
income inequality. I theorize that when wage setting and job matching are based primarily on
internal (external) considerations, income inequality in a society will be lower (higher). In ILMs,
the wage premium for lower-skilled workers is typically higher than for higher-skilled ones
(Groshen & Levine, 1998), providing lower levels of between-group income inequality than
would be experienced outside a firm's boundaries. The desire to maintain norms of fairness also
implies a smaller disjuncture in wages between workers throughout the hierarchy (Doeringer &
Piore, 1971). Wages tied to worker productivity and firm performance as well as a reliance on
external hiring, lead to greater returns to workers’ observable characteristics, such as education,
credentials, and productivity, creating greater variance in returns to labor. These same
considerations also influence rates of executive pay such that when firms utilize performancebased pay, external benchmarking, and external hiring, executive pay will be greater. Moreover,
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efforts to externalize employment through non-standard work arrangements and layoffs also put
downward pressure on wages of low- to mid-income workers, further exacerbating wage
differentials at the societal level. Taken together, whether employers take an organizational
versus a market focus when structuring their employment relationships has important
distributional consequences for society.
I also discuss a number of firm-level factors that help determine whether a firm takes a
market or organizational orientation. Leveraging insights from power-dependence and sociopolitical theories of executive decision making, I argue that firms are composed of a set of
coalitions with different interests and sources of influence. Because a market versus an
organizational orientation has implications for how firm resources are allocated between
stakeholders, the power and interests of different organizational actors helps determine which
strategy an employer will pursue. Specifically, I contend that the structure of equity ownership,
the prevalence of a corporate takeover market, the structure of executive compensation, and
decision making schemas of top executives encourage the adoption of practices associated with a
market versus an organizational orientation.
Implications for Organizational Theory
Earlier contributions to organizational theory, such as the behavioral theory of the firm
(e.g., Cyert & March, 1963), paid considerable attention to the role coalitional conflict played in
affecting firm outcomes. The model presented here suggests these same mechanisms may be
relevant to our understanding of societal-level outcomes. Furthermore, while organizational
scholars have made many important advances in our understanding of changing employment
practices and the forces motivating them, scant attention has been paid to the distributional
consequences of these decisions on society. This omission has had the consequence of leaving
the study of income inequality to fields of study less likely to consider the role of employers and
firm-level decision making. The lack of attention to social outcomes is part of a broader trend
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whereby organizational theory has largely bypassed the study of societal issues and instead
focused on firm outcomes and inter-organizational dynamics (Perrow, 1986). When social issues
are considered, such as in the study of corporate social responsibility, researchers too often
examine firm outcomes to the neglect of studying firms’ impact upon society (see Banerjee,
2008; Walsh, Weber, & Margolis, 2003). There is a precedent, however, for the study of social
issues by organizational scholars, as the impact of hierarchies on individuals and society was a
central concern of earlier scholarship (e.g., Boulding, 1953). Notably, a number of early accounts
speculated that the processes and modalities prevalent in organizations directly impacted the
well-being of their employees (Katz & Kahn, 1966; Whyte, 1956), and more contemporary
research has found that the type of job one holds (e.g., its position in the organizational
hierarchy) plays a vital role in outcomes related to individual health and well-being (e.g.,
Marmot et al., 1991). By viewing firm strategy and structure as an important driver of societallevel income inequality, this model points to employers as key drivers of social welfare and
suggests that within the purview of organizational theory, researchers should once again explore
firms as promulgators of societal change (Hinings & Greenwood, 2002; Stern & Barley, 1996).
Conceptual work from the structuralist perspective of stratification was acutely interested
in the impact firms had on their environment, and argued that employers, through their decisions
about processes of job allocation and wage setting, help determine levels of income stratification
(Baron & Bielby, 1980). Empirical studies in this milieu, however, documented features of
organizations giving rise to intra-firm income inequality, without attention given to how firms
impact inequality in a society (Sørensen, 2007). As a starting point, I take insights from the
structuralist perspective and combine them with economic and sociological literature on labor
markets as well as organizational scholarship on employment practices. From this, I develop a
model that articulates a set of mechanisms through which firm strategy and structure leads to
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societal-level income inequality. In so doing, I answer recent calls to integrate income inequality
research and organizational theory (Sørensen & Sorenson, 2007).
Lastly, while organizational scholars have been largely silent about the factors that lead
to societal levels of income inequality, the impact of income dispersion on individual outcomes,
such as motivation and turnover (Shaw, Gupta, & Delery, 2002; Trevor, Reilly, & Gerhart, 2012;
Wade et al., 2006), as well as firm-level outcomes like performance (Bloom, 1999; Fredrickson,
Davis-Blake, & Sanders, 2010), have been important areas of inquiry.4 Generating a more
complete understanding of how firms create income inequality, therefore, may inform interest in
the impact of income inequality on individual, group, firm, and societal dynamics.
Implications for the Study of Income Inequality
Existing perspectives on the rise of income inequality focus primarily on market-based
explanations (e.g., SBTC, globalization), unions, minimum wages, and tax policy (Morris &
Western, 1999: 642). While each of these streams have provided valuable insights into the
drivers of income inequality, the explanations are often not supported by cross-national analyses
(DiPrete, 2007), suggesting other factors may be important. By failing to consider the role of
firms in processes of wage setting, job matching, and boundary placement, existing research
overlooks potentially important firm-level factors driving differences in income inequality over
time. Employers help determine labor market outcomes (Baron & Bielby, 1980), and research
indicates that much of the increase in income inequality is due to employers paying similar
workers differently (Groshen, 1991)."The market is always embodied in specific institutions
such as corporate hierarchies" (Piketty, 2014: 332); as such, the model I present here extends
existing research by examining why corporate hierarchies vary in their strategy and structure
based on factors that influence executive decision making.
A firm-centered theory of income inequality may also complement existing theories of
the phenomenon. For example, research has shown differences in the extent to which computer
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programmable design tasks are handled by front-line operators versus engineers and whether
these capital investments lead to labor force reductions. This research suggests employer choice
determines whether technology is skill-biased and leads to layoffs (e.g., Kelley, 1994; Noble,
1984). Technology also provides the means for companies to alter their boundaries through
outsourcing and offshoring (Sahaym, Steensma, & Schilling, 2007). Studies of the effects of
minimum wage rates may be enriched by considering how many and which workers get sorted
into low-wage jobs. Incorporating in existing theories how executives come to make these
decisions suggests the presence of boundary conditions that can add greater precision.
Future Research Directions
The model I have developed here is not without limitations. First, while some of the
constructs I include have well-established, valid measures, others, such as the presence of ILMs,
do not. Previous research used proxies such as organizational size as an indicator of ILMs (e.g.,
Davis & Cobb, 2010). Over the past 30 years in the US, the firm size-ILM link, however, has
weakened as many of the largest employers (e.g., Wal-Mart) now pay low wages and do not
utilize ILMs to the extent that many of the large firms did in decades prior (e.g., General Motors,
AT&T). Future empirical research, however, can exploit large-scale, matched firm-employee
data found in many Scandinavian countries, and others such as the Longitudinal EmployerHousehold Dynamics and the Workplace Employment Relations Study that provide information
on remuneration, occupational breakdowns, and employment practices of a number of large
firms in a society. Cross-national comparisons, as proposed here, will likely necessitate
collaborations between scholars with expertise and data access across countries.
Second, I do not theorize about the role of labor as a key organizational stakeholder.
Individually, employees have little power to impact firm strategy, but employee power can be
enhanced greatly when they can mobilize and act collectively through unions. Important goals of
unions are to set pay equally across similar workers and to limit the wage disjuncture across
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different workers, which tends to reduce wage dispersion (Western & Rosenfeld, 2011).
However, because a number of studies have sought to establish a relationship between unions
and income inequality, I did not offer propositions about the connection here.
Notably, however, unions play a crucial role in how much discretion firms have in
structuring their employment relationships. For example, unions have been shown to deter the
use of contingent employment relationships (Gramm & Schnell, 2001) and reduce levels of
executive compensation (Banning & Chiles, 2007). Their ability to influence firm outcomes
depends greatly on the scope and strength of union representation rights (Beramendi & Cusack,
2009). In countries like the US, the UK (since 1980), Canada, and New Zealand, for example,
unions bargain with individual firms and plants, leading to greater intra-industry variance on the
impact organized labor has on wages, benefits, and conditions of work. This is not the case,
however, in the Scandinavian countries and in Germany, where systems of codetermination,
work councils, and other forms of industrial democracy provide workers greater power in
determining the trajectory of the labor market (Scheve & Stasavage, 2009). While beyond the
scope of this paper, any discussion of income inequality can be importantly informed by
examining union density rates and the extent to which collective bargaining is centralized versus
fragmented as these factors have influence on the types of practices firms use to structure their
employment relationships (Oskarsson, 2005; Western & Rosenfeld, 2011).
Finally, my efforts to achieve parsimony led me to focus on a relatively small number of
employment practices. Other practices, such as those related to high-performance work, may
affect wage dispersion, and future research can explore additional ways in which employers
influence rates of income inequality. Moreover, I utilized a single theoretical perspective in
developing my arguments for how executives choose between a market and organizational
orientation. Insights from other organizational theories, however, may also shed light on how
these decisions are made. Below, I briefly elaborate on two such theoretical perspectives.
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Institutional environment. The formal and informal institutions in a society may also
play a key role in how employment relationships get set and the extent to which executives have
the discretion to influence them (Crossland & Hambrick, 2011). For example, whether a
country's system of corporate governance favors minority versus majority shareholders
influences the types of investors that take equity stakes in firms (Coffee, 2001) as well as how
active the takeover market is in a country (Schneper & Guillen, 2004). Moreover, labor laws, the
presence of skill formation institutions, levels of unionization, and centralized wage bargaining
may play integral roles in employers’ use of ILMs, their ability to use non-standard employment
relationships, and the prevalence of layoffs (Crouch, Findegold, & Sako, 1999; Dasgupta, 2001).
Furthermore, in collectivist cultures, inequalities in income are more likely to be seen as
disruptive and illegitimate. Such concerns, for example, are thought to be a main reason why
executive compensation is much smaller in Japan than in countries like the US and the UK (The
Economist, 2010). Future research can explore more closely the regulatory, normative, and
cultural-cognitive institutions in a society that may impact processes of wage setting, job
matching, and firm boundary placement.
Organizational population dynamics. Insights from population ecology emphasize that
a firm’s strategy is influenced by the social technologies available to it at the time of its founding
(Stinchcombe, 1965). Firms that emerged during eras when institutional and economic factors
favored either the use of a market or organizational orientation, therefore, may be affected by
these factors when determinig how employment relationships get structured. For example, firms
that emerged following the managerial revolution at the turn of the 20th century employed a
higher proportion of administrative workers than firms founded in older industries (Marquis &
Tilcsik, 2013). When employment is concentrated in firms that emerged in a period where an
organization orientation dominated (e.g., in the US from the 1950s to the 1970s), we should
expect to see firms continue to use practices associated with an organization orientation and
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greater resistance to efforts to utilize a more market-oriented approach. Future work can explore
the types of employment relationships that dominated in the eras of firms’ founding to determine
whether these factors influences rates of income inequality at the societal level.
CONCLUSION
Witnessing rising levels of income inequality throughout much of the developed world
and holding concerns for its impact on society, scholars from across the social sciences have
made great strides in understanding the phenomenon. However, there is more work that can be
done to refine, enhance, and expand our knowledge of the factors driving rates of income
inequality around the world. Considering societal levels of income inequality to be, in part, an
outcome of processes that set wages, match workers to positions, and determine where firm
boundaries are placed opens up important and new avenues of research for scholars of both
income inequality and organizations. While employer practices are not the sole determinant of
income inequality, they play an important yet understudied role. Accounting for the ways in
which employer practices influence societal outcomes has the potential to enrich our
understanding of the dynamics undergirding income differentials and provides organizational
researchers a starting point to examine this critical social issue.
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FOOTNOTES
1

Most aggregate measures of income inequality include all forms of income, but because

investment income is disproportionately earned by top earners, a key factor differentiating
measures of top incomes from those considering lower parts of the distribution is the role of
investment income versus salary income (Piketty, 2014). In some instances, the distinction
between investment and labor income gets blurred, particularly in the context of stock-based
compensation. Across countries, stock option compensation sometimes appears as wage income
or capital income in tax statistics, depending on the tax law (Atkinson et al., 2011). This makes
cross-national analyses of stock options on income inequality complex. For the purposes of this
model, labor income includes the value of options as they are earned as a condition of
employment.
2

Based on my own calculations on data taken from the Standardized World Income Inequality

Database (Solt, 2014).
3

I concentrate my review on explanations that involve the setting process and those that are the

most common explanations for the phenomenon. Other explanations that I do not cover include
family formation practices (see McCall & Percheski, 2010) and political representation dynamics
(see Brady & Sosnaud, 2010).
4

Political scientists are also interested in the impact of income inequality on outcomes such as

voter behavior (e.g., Meltzer & Richard, 1981).
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TABLE 1
Features of Organization and Market Oriented Employment Systems
Organizational Orientation

Market Orientation

Wage setting

How do wages get set?

Tied to job using formal job evaluation; based more on

Tied to individual using external market mechanism;

administrative rules; lower pay variance within and

based on skills and performance; larger pay variance

across jobs

within and across jobs
Externally competitive wages; incentivize worker

Goal

Internal equity; reduce costs of social comparison
productivity

Job matching
How do workers get matched
Internal hiring (above entry-level); based on seniority

External hiring; based on skills and credentials

to positions?
Reduce avoidable turnover; encourage development of
Goal

Just-in-time skill acquisition
firm-specific skills

Skill development
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Employer develops talent; on-the-job formal and

Employer acquires talent; reliance on skill development

informal training

outside the firm

How do workers gain skills?

Avoid costs of developing and maintaining excess
Goal

Greater stability and predictability of skill supply
internal talent

Firm boundaries
Where does firm place its

Stable boundaries; heavy reliance on stable, full-time

Permeable boundaries; heavy reliance on non-standard

boundaries?

employment relationships

work arrangements and work reorganization

Goal

Operational stability

Operational flexibility
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FIGURE 1
Model of Firms’ Affect on Societal-level Income Inequality
Market orientation
Monitoring and incentives

External labor markets

• Finance-oriented share
ownership

• Takeover market

• Market mechanisms set
P5a,b,
6,7

wages

• External hiring

• Equity-based executive pay

P1

Executive compensation
• Peformance-based pay

P2a,b,c

• External benchmarking

• External hiring
CEO power and
decision making
• Finance and economics
background

P8

Firm boundaries
• Non-standard work
arrangements

• Layoffs
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P3,4

Level of income
inequality

FIGURE 2
Internal Labor Market Mechanisms and Societal-level Income Inequality

Mechanisms

Internal labor markets

Wage premium greater for
lower-skilled than higherskilled workers

(+)

Compresses wages between
groups

(+)
(-)

Job evaluation based on norms
of equity

(+)

Compresses wages within
groups

Internal hiring and skill
development

(+)

Upward mobility and skill
enhancement
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